Characterizing and Detecting Hateful Users on Twitter by Ribeiro, Manoel Horta et al.
Characterizing and Detecting Hateful Users on Twitter∗
Manoel Horta Ribeiro, Pedro H. Calais, Yuri A. Santos, Virgı´lio A. F. Almeida, Wagner Meira Jr.
{manoelribeiro,pcalais,yuriasantos,virgilio,meira}@dcc.ufmg.br
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil
Abstract
Most current approaches to characterize and detect hate
speech focus on content posted in Online Social Networks.
They face shortcomings to collect and annotate hateful
speech due to the incompleteness and noisiness of OSN text
and the subjectivity of hate speech. These limitations are of-
ten aided with constraints that oversimplify the problem, such
as considering only tweets containing hate-related words. In
this work we partially address these issues by shifting the fo-
cus towards users. We develop and employ a robust method-
ology to collect and annotate hateful users which does not
depend directly on lexicon and where the users are annotated
given their entire profile. This results in a sample of Twit-
ter’s retweet graph containing 100, 386 users, out of which
4, 972 were annotated. We also collect the users who were
banned in the three months that followed the data collection.
We show that hateful users differ from normal ones in terms
of their activity patterns, word usage and as well as network
structure. We obtain similar results comparing the neighbors
of hateful vs. neighbors of normal users and also suspended
users vs. active users, increasing the robustness of our analy-
sis. We observe that hateful users are densely connected, and
thus formulate the hate speech detection problem as a task of
semi-supervised learning over a graph, exploiting the network
of connections on Twitter. We find that a node embedding
algorithm, which exploits the graph structure, outperforms
content-based approaches for the detection of both hateful
(95% AUC vs 88% AUC) and suspended users (93% AUC
vs 88% AUC). Altogether, we present a user-centric view of
hate speech, paving the way for better detection and under-
standing of this relevant and challenging issue.
Introduction
The importance of understanding hate speech in Online So-
cial Networks (OSNs) is manifold. Countries such as Ger-
many have strict legislation against the practice (Stein 1986),
the presence of such content may pose problems for ad-
vertisers (The Guardian 2017) and users (Sabatini and Sar-
racino 2017), and manually inspecting all possibly hateful
content in OSNs is unfeasible (Schmidt and Wiegand 2017).
Furthermore, the trade-off between banning such behavior
from platforms and not censoring dissenting opinions is a
major societal issue (Rainie, Anderson, and Albright 2017).
∗This is an extended version of the homonymous short paper to
be presented at ICWSM-18.
This scenario has motivated work that aims to under-
stand and detect hateful content (Greevy and Smeaton 2004;
Warner and Hirschberg 2012; Burnap and Williams 2016),
by creating representations for tweets or comments in an
OSN, e.g. word2vec (Mikolov et al. 2013), and then clas-
sifying them as hateful or not, often drawing insights on
the nature of hateful speech. However, in OSNs, the mean-
ing of such content is often not self-contained, referring, for
instance, to some event which just happened and the texts
are packed with informal language, spelling errors, special
characters and sarcasm (Dhingra et al. 2016; Riloff et al.
2013). Besides that, hate speech itself is highly subjective,
reliant on temporal, social and historical context, and occurs
sparsely (Schmidt and Wiegand 2017). These problems, al-
though observed, remain unaddressed (Davidson et al. 2017;
Magu, Joshi, and Luo 2017). Consider the tweet:
Timesup, yall getting w should have happened long ago
Which was in reply to another tweet that mentioned the
holocaust. Although the tweet, whose author’s profile con-
tained white-supremacy imagery, incited violence, it is hard
to conceive how this could be detected as hateful with only
textual features. Furthermore, the lack of hate-related words
makes it difficult for this kind of tweet to be sampled.
Fortunately, as we just hinted, the data in posts, tweets or
messages are not the only signals we may use to study hate
speech in OSNs. Most often, these signals are linked to a
profile representing a person or organization. Characterizing
and detecting hateful users shares much of the benefits of de-
tecting hateful content and presents plenty of opportunities
to explore a richer feature space. Furthermore, on a practi-
cal hate speech guideline enforcement process, containing
humans in the loop, its is natural that user profiles will be
checked, rather than isolated tweets. The case can be made
that this wider context is sometimes needed to define hate
speech, such as in the example, where the abuse was made
clear by the neo-nazi signs in the user’s profile.
Analyzing hate on a user-level rather than content-level
enables our characterization to explore not only content, but
also dimensions such as the user’s activity and connections.
Moreover, it allows us to use the very structure of Twitter’s
network in the task of detecting hateful users (Hamilton,
Ying, and Leskovec 2017b).
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Figure 1: Network of 100, 386 users sampled from Twitter
after our diffusion process. Red nodes indicate the proximity
of users to those who employed words in our lexicon.
Present Work In this paper we characterize and detect
hateful users on Twitter, which we define according to Twit-
ter’s hateful conduct guidelines. We collect a dataset of
100, 386 users along with up to 200 tweets for each with
a random-walk-based crawler on Twitter’s retweet graph.
We identify users that employed words from a set of hate
speech related lexicon, and generate a subsample selecting
users that are in different distances to such users. These are
manually annotated as hateful or not through crowdsourc-
ing. The aforementioned distances are real valued numbers
obtained through a diffusion process in which the users who
used the words in the lexicon are seeds. We create a dataset
containing 4, 972 manually annotated users, of which 544
were labeled as hateful. We also find the users that have been
suspended after the data collection - before and after Twit-
ter’s guideline changes, which happened on the 18/Dec/17.
Studying these users, we find significant differences be-
tween the activity patterns of hateful and normal users: hate-
ful users tweet more frequently, follow more people each
day and their accounts are more short-lived and recent
While the media stereotypes hateful individuals as “lone
wolves” (Burke 2017), we find that hateful users are not in
the periphery of the retweet network we sampled. Although
they have less followers, the median for several network cen-
trality measures in the retweet network is higher for those
users. We also find that these users do not seem to behave
like spammers.
A lexical analysis using Empath (Fast, Chen, and Bern-
stein 2016) shows that their choice of vocabulary is differ-
ent: words related to hate, anger and politics occur less often
when compared to their normal counterparts, and words re-
lated to masculinity, love and curses occur more often. This
is noteworthy, as much of the previous work directly em-
ploys hate-related words as a data-collection mechanism.
We compare the neighborhood of hateful with the neigh-
borhood of normal users in the retweet graph, as well as ac-
counts that have been suspended with those who were not.
We argue that these suspended accounts and accounts that
retweeted hateful users are also proxies for hateful speech
online, and the similar results found in many of the analyses
performed increase the robustness of our findings.
We also compare users who have been banned before and
after Twitter’s recent guideline change, finding an increase
in the number of users banned per day, but little difference
in terms of their vocabulary, activity and network structure.
Finally, we find that hateful users and suspended users are
very densely connected in the retweet network we sampled.
Hateful users are 71 times more likely to retweet other hate-
ful users and suspended users are 11 times more likely to
retweet other suspended users. This motivates us to pose
the problem of detecting hate speech as a task of super-
vised learning over graphs. We employ a node embedding
algorithm that creates a low-dimensional representation of
nodes in a network to then classify it. We demonstrate ro-
bust performance to detect both hateful and suspended users
in such fashion (95% AUC and 93% AUC) and show that
this approach outperforms traditional state-of-the-art classi-
fiers (88% AUC and 88% AUC, respectively).
Altogether, this work presents a user-centric view of the
problem of hate speech. Our code and data are available 1.
Background
Hateful Users We define “hateful user” and “hate speech”
according to Twitter’s guidelines. For the purposes of this
paper, “hate speech” is any type of content that ‘promotes
violence against or directly attack or threaten other people
on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orien-
tation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, dis-
ability, or disease.” (Twitter 2017) On the other hand, “hate-
ful user” is a user that, according to annotators, endorses
such type of content.
Retweet Graph The retweet graph G is a directed graph
G = (V,E) where each node u ∈ V represents a user in
Twitter, and each edge (u1, u2) ∈ E implies that the user
u1 has retweeted u2. Previous work suggests that retweets
are better than followers to judge users’ influence (Cha et
al. 2010). As influence flows in the opposite direction of
retweets, we invert the graph’s edges.
Offensive Language We employ Waseem et al. definition
of explicit abusive language, which defines it as language
that is unambiguous in its potential to be abusive, for ex-
ample language that contains racial or homophobic slurs.
The use of this kind of language doesn’t imply hate speech,
although there is a clear correlation (Davidson et al. 2017).
Suspended Accounts Most Twitter accounts are sus-
pended due to spam, however they are harder to reach in the
retweet graph as they rarely get retweeted. We use Twitter’s
API to find the accounts that have been suspended among the
100, 386 collected users, and use these as another source for
potentially hateful behavior. We collect accounts that have
been suspended two months after the data collection, on
12/Dec/2017, and after Twitter’s hateful conduct guideline
changes, on 14/Jan/2018. The new guidelines are allegedly
stricter, considering for instance, off-the-platform behavior.
1https://github.com/manoelhortaribeiro/HatefulUsersTwitter
Figure 2: Toy exampl´e of the diffusion process. (i) We begin
with the sampled retweet graph G; (ii) We revert the direc-
tion of the edges (the way influence flows), add self loops to
every node, and mark the users who employed words in our
lexicon; (iii) We iteratively update the belief of other nodes.
Data Collection
Most previous work on detecting hate speech on Twitter em-
ploys a lexicon-based data collection, which involves sam-
pling tweets that contain specific words (Davidson et al.
2017; Waseem and Hovy 2016), such as wetb*cks or
fagg*t. However, this methodology is biased towards a
very direct, textual and offensive hate speech. It presents dif-
ficulties with statements that subtly disseminate hate with
no offensive words, as in "Who convinced Muslim
girls they were pretty?" (Davidson et al. 2017);
And also with the usage of code words, as in the use of the
word "skypes", employed to reference jews (Magu, Joshi,
and Luo 2017; Meme 2016); In this scenario, we propose
collecting users rather than tweets, relying on lexicon only
indirectly, and collecting the structure of these users in the
social network, which we will later use to characterize and
detect hate.
We represent the connections among users in Twitter us-
ing the retweet network (Cha et al. 2010). Sampling the
retweet network is hard as we can only observe out-coming
edges (due to API limitations), and as it is known that any
unbiased in-degree estimation is impossible without sam-
pling most of these “hidden” edges in the graph (Ribeiro
et al. 2012). Acknowledging this limitation, we employ
Ribeiro et al. Direct Unbiased Random Walk algorithm,
which estimates out-degrees distribution efficiently by per-
forming random jumps in an undirected graph it constructs
online (Ribeiro, Wang, and Towsley 2010). Fortunately, in
the retweet graph the outcoming edges of each user repre-
sent the other users she - usually (Guerra et al. 2017) - en-
dorses. With this strategy, we collect a sample of Twitter
retweet graph with 100, 386 users and 2, 286, 592 retweet
edges along with the 200 most recent tweets for each users,
as shown in Figure 1. This graph is unbiased w.r.t. the out
degree distribution of nodes.
As the sampled graph is too large to be annotated entirely,
we need to select a subsample to be annotated. If we choose
tweets uniformly at random, we risk having a very insignif-
icant percentage of hate speech in the subsample. On the
other hand, if we choose only tweets that use obvious hate
speech features, such as offensive racial slurs, we will stum-
ble in the same problems pointed in previous work. We pro-
pose a method between these two extremes. We:
1. Create a lexicon of words that are mostly used in the con-
text of hate speech. This is unlike other work (Davidson
et al. 2017) as we do not consider words that are em-
ployed in a hateful context but often used in other con-
texts in a harmless way (e.g. n*gger); We use 23 words
such as holohoax, racial treason and white
genocide, handpicked from Hatebase.org (Hate Base
2017), and ADL’s hate symbol database (ADL 2017).
2. Run a diffusion process on the graph based on DeGroot’s
Learning Model (Golub and Jackson 2010), assigning an
initial belief p0i = 1 to each user ui who employed the
words in the lexicon; This prevents our sample from being
excessively small or biased towards some vocabulary.
3. Divide the users in 4 strata according to their associated
beliefs after the diffusion process, and perform a stratified
sampling, obtaining up to 1500 user per strata.
We briefly present our diffusion model, as illustrated in
Figure 2. Let A be the adjacency matrix of our retweeted
graph G = (V,E) where each node u ∈ V represents a user
and each edge (u, v) ∈ E represents a retweet. We have that
A[u, v] = 1 if u retweeted v. We create a transition matrix
T by inverting the edges in A (as influence flows from the
retweeted user to the user who retweeted him or her), adding
a self loop to each of the nodes and then normalizing each
row in A so it sums to 1. This means each user is equally
influenced by every user he or she retweets.
We then associate a belief p0i = 1 to every user who em-
ployed one of the words in our lexicon, and p0i = 0 to all
who didn’t. Lastly, we create new beliefs pt using the up-
date rule: pt = Tpt−1. Notice that all the beliefs pti con-
verge to the same value as t→∞, thus we run the diffusion
process with t = 2. With this real value (p2i ∈ [0, 1]) asso-
ciated with each user, we get 4 strata by randomly selecting
up to 1500 users with pi in the intervals [0, .25), [.25, .50),
[.50, .75) and [.75, 1]. This ensures that we annotate users
that didn’t employ any of the words in our lexicon, yet have
a high potential to be hateful due to homophily.
We annotate 4, 972 users as hateful or not using Crowd-
Flower, a crowdsourcing service. The annotators were given
the definition of hateful conduct according to Twitter’s
guidelines and asked, for each user:
Does this account endorse content that is humiliating,
derogatory or insulting towards some group of individ-
uals (gender, religion, race) or support narratives as-
sociated with hate groups (white genocide, holocaust
denial, jewish conspiracy, racial superiority)?
Annotators were asked to consider the entire profile (lim-
iting the tweets to the ones collected) rather than individual
publications or isolate words and were given examples of
terms and codewords in ADL’s hate symbol database. Each
user profile was independently annotated by 3 annotators,
and, if there was disagreement, up to 5 annotators. In the
end, 544 hateful users and 4, 427 normal ones were identi-
fied by them. The sample of the retweet network was col-
lected between the 1st and 7th of Oct/17, and annotation be-
gan immediately after. We also obtained all users suspended
up to 12/Dec/17 (387) and up to 14/Jan/18 (668).
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Figure 3: Average values for several activity-related statistics for hateful users, normal users, users in the neighborhood of
those, and suspended/active users. The avg(interval) was calculated on the 200 tweets extracted for each user. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals. The legend used in this graph is kept in the remainder of the paper.
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Figure 4: KDEs of the creation dates of user accounts. The
white dot indicates the median and the thicker bar indicates
the first and third quartiles.
Characterizing Hateful Users
We analyze how hateful and normal users differ w.r.t. their
activity, vocabulary and network centrality. We also com-
pare the neighbors of hateful and of normal users, and sus-
pended/active users to reinforce our findings, as homophily
suggests that the neighbors will share a lot of characteristics
with annotated users, and as suspended users may have been
banned because of hateful conduct 2. We compare those in
pairs as the sampling mechanism for each of the populations
is different. We argue that each one of these pairs contains
a proxy for hateful speech in Twitter, and thus inspecting
the three increases the robustness of our analysis. P-values
given are from unequal variances t-tests to compare the aver-
ages across distinct populations. When we refer to “hateful
users”, we refer to the ones annotated as hateful. The number
of users in each of these groups is given in the table bellow:
Table 1: Number of users in each group.
Hateful Normal
Hateful
Neighbors
Normal
Neighbors Banned Active
544 4427 3471 33564 668 99718
2We use suspended and banned interchangeably.
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Figure 5: Boxplots for the distribution of metrics that indi-
cate spammers. Hateful users have slightly less followers per
followee, less URLs per tweet, and less hashtags per tweet.
Hateful users have newer accounts
The account creation date of users is depicted in Figure 4.
Hateful users were created later than normal ones (p-value
< 0.001). A hypothesis for this difference is that hateful
users are banned more often due to Twitter’s guidelines in-
fringement. This resonates with existing methods for de-
tecting fake accounts in which using the account’s creation
date have been successful (Viswanath et al. 2015). We ob-
tain similar results w.r.t. the 1-neighborhood of such users,
where the hateful neighbors were also created more recently
(p-value < 0.001), and also when comparing suspended and
active accounts (p-value < 0.001).
Hateful users are power users
Other interesting metrics for analysis are the number of
tweets, followers, followees and favorite tweets a user has,
and the interval in seconds between their tweets. We show
these statistics in Figure 3. We normalize the number of
tweets, followers and followees by the number of days the
users have since their account creation date. Our results sug-
gest that hateful users are “power users” in the sense that
they tweet more, in shorter intervals, favorite more tweets by
other people and follow other users more (p-values < 0.01).
The analysis yields similar results when we compare the 1-
neighborhood of hateful and normal users, and when com-
paring suspended and active accounts (p-values < 0.01,
except for the number of favorites when comparing sus-
pended/active users, and for the average interval, when com-
paring the neighborhood).
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Figure 6: Average values for the relative occurrence of several categories in Empath. Notice that not all Empath categories were
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Figure 7: Box plots for the distribution of sentiment and
subjectivity and bad-words usage. Suspended users, hate-
ful users and their neighborhood are more negative, and use
more bad words than their counterparts.
Hateful users don’t behave like spammers
We investigate whether users that propagate hate speech are
spammers. We analyze metrics that have been used by previ-
ous work to detect spammers, such as the numbers of URLs
per tweet, of hashtags per tweet and of followers per fol-
lowees (Benevenuto et al. 2010). The boxplot of these dis-
tributions is shown on Figure 5. We find that hateful users
use, in average, less hashtags (p-value < 0.001) and less
URLs (p-value < 0.001) per tweet than normal users. The
same analysis holds if we compare the 1-neighborhood of
hateful and non-hateful, or suspended and active users (with
p-values < 0.05, except for the number of followers per
followees, where there is no statistical significance to the
t-test). Additionally, we also find that, in average, normal
users have more followers per followees than hateful ones
(p-value< 0.05), which also happens for their neighborhood
(p-value < 0.05). This suggests that the hateful and sus-
pended users do not use systematic and programmatic meth-
ods to deliver their content. Notice that it is not possible to
extrapolate this finding to Twitter in general, as there maybe
be hateful users with other behaviors which our data collec-
tion methodology does not consider, as we do not specifi-
cally look for trending topics or popular hashtags.
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Figure 8: Network centrality metrics for hateful and normal
users, their neighborhood, and suspended/non-suspended
users calculated on the sampled retweet graph.
The median hateful user is more central
We analyze different measures of centrality for users, as de-
picted in Figure 8. The median hateful user is more central
in all measures when compared to their normal counterparts.
This is a counter-intuitive finding, as hateful crimes have
long been associated with “lone wolves”, and anti-social
people (Burke 2017). We observe similar results when com-
paring the median eigenvector centrality of the neighbors of
hateful and normal users, as well as suspended and active
users. In the latter pair, suspended users also have higher
median out degree. When analyzing the average for such
statistics, we observe the average eigenvector centrality is
higher for the opposite sides of the previous comparisons.
This happens because some very influential users distort the
value: for example, the 970 most central users according to
the metric are normal. Notice that despite of this, hateful and
suspended users have higher average out degree than normal
and active users respectively (p-value < 0.05).
Figure 9: Corhort-like depiction of the banning of users.
Table 2: Percentage/number of accounts that got suspended
up before and after the guidelines changed.
Susp. Accounts Hateful Normal Others
2017-12-12 9.09%/55 0.32%/14 0.33%/318
2018-01-14 17.64%/96 0.90%/40 0.55%/532
Hateful users use non-trivial vocabulary
We characterize users w.r.t. their content with Empath (Fast,
Chen, and Bernstein 2016), as depicted in Figure 6. Hate-
ful users use less words related to hate, anger, shame and
terrorism, violence, and sadness when compared to normal
users (with p-values < 0.001). A question this raises is how
sampling tweets based exclusively in a hate-related lexicon
biases the sample of content to be annotated to a very spe-
cific type of “hate-spreading” user, and reinforces the claims
that sarcasm, code-words and very specific slang plays a sig-
nificant role in defining such users (Davidson et al. 2017;
Magu, Joshi, and Luo 2017).
Categories of words more used by hateful users include
positive emotions, negative emotions, suffering, work, love
and swearing (with p-values < 0.001), suggesting the use
of emotional vocabulary. An interesting direction would be
to analyze the sensationalism of their statements, as it has
been done in the context of clickbaits (Chen, Conroy, and
Rubin 2015). When we compare the neighborhood of hate-
ful and normal users and suspended vs active users, we ob-
tain very similar results (with p-values < 0.001 except for
when comparing suspended vs. active users usage of anger,
terrorism and sadness, swearing and love). Overall, the non-
triviality of the vocabulary of these groups of users rein-
forces the difficulties found in the NLP approaches to sam-
ple, annotate and detect hate speech (Davidson et al. 2017;
Magu, Joshi, and Luo 2017).
We also explore the sentiment in the tweets users write
using a corpus based approach, as depicted in Figure 7. We
find that sentences written by hateful and suspended users
are more negative, and are less subjective (p-value< 0.001).
The neighbors of hateful users in the retweet graph are also
more negative (p-value < 0.001), however not less subjec-
tive. We also analyze the distribution of profanity per tweet
in hateful and non-hateful users. The latter is obtained by
matching all words in Shutterstock’s “List of Dirty, Naughty,
Obscene, and Otherwise Bad Words” 3. We find that sus-
pended users, hateful users and their neighbors employ more
profane words per tweet, also confirming the results from the
analysis with Empath (p-value < 0.01).
3
https://github.com/LDNOOBW/List-of-Dirty-Naughty-Obscene-and-Otherwise-Bad-Words
Table 3: Occurrence of the edges between hateful and nor-
mal users, and between suspended and active users.
Results are normalized w.r.t. to the type of the source node,
as in: P (source type→dest type|source type). Notice that the
probabilities do not add to 1 in hateful and normal users as
we don’t present the statistics for non-annotated users.
Node Type (%) Node Type (%)
→ 41.50 → 13.10
→ 15.90 → 2.86
→ 7.50 → 92.50
→ 99.35 → 0.65
More users are banned after the guideline changes,
but they are similar to the ones banned before
Twitter has changed its enforcement of hateful conduct
guidelines in 18/Dec/2017. We analyze the differences
among accounts that have been suspended two months
after the end of the annotation, in 12/Dec/2017 and in
14/Jan/2018.
The intersection between these groups and the ones we
annotated as hateful or not is shown in Table 2. In the first
period from the end of the data annotation to the 12/Dec,
there were approximately 6.45 banned users a day whereas
in the second period there were 9.05. This trend, illustrated
in Figure 9, suggests an increased banning activity.
Performing the lexical analysis we previously applied to
compare hateful and normal users we do not find statistically
significant difference w.r.t. the averages for users banned be-
fore and after the guideline change (except for government-
related words, where p-value < 0.05). We also analyze the
number of tweets, followers/followees, and the previously
mentioned centrality measures, and observe no statistical
significance in difference between the averages or the distri-
butions (which were compared using KS-test). This suggests
that Twitter has not changed the type of users banned.
Hateful users are densely connected
Finally, we analyze the frequency at which hateful and nor-
mal users, as well as suspended and active users, interact
within their own group and with each other. Table 3 depicts
the probability of an node of a given type retweeting other
type of node. We find that 41% of the retweets of hateful
users are to other hateful users, which means that they are 71
times more likely to retweet another hateful user, consider-
ing the occurrence of hateful users in the graph. We observe
a similar phenomenon with suspended users, which have 7%
of their retweets redirected towards other suspended users.
As suspended users correspond to only 0.68% of the users
sampled, this means they are approximately 11 times more
likely to retweet other suspended users.
The high density of connections among hateful and sus-
pended users suggest a strong modularity. We exploit this,
along with activity and network centrality attributes to ro-
bustly detect these users.
Table 4: Prediction results and standard deviations for the two proposed settings: detecting hateful users and detecting suspended
users. The semi-supervised node embedding approach performs better than state-of-the-art supervised learning algorithms in
all the assessed criteria, suggesting the benefits of exploiting the network structure to detect hateful and suspended users.
Hateful/Normal Suspended/Active
Model Features Accuracy F1-Score AUC Accuracy F1-Score AUC
GradBoost user+glove 84.6± 1.0 52.0± 2.2 88.4± 1.3 81.5± 0.6 48.4± 1.1 88.6± 0.1
glove 84.4± 0.5 52.0± 1.3 88.4± 1.3 78.9± 0.7 44.8± 0.7 87.0± 0.5
AdaBoost user+glove 69.1± 2.4 37.6± 2.4 85.5± 1.4 70.1± 0.1 38.3± 0.9 84.3± 0.5
glove 69.1± 2.5 37.6± 2.4 85.5± 1.4 69.7± 1.0 37.5± 0.8 82.7± 0.1
GraphSage user+glove 90.9± 1.1 67.0± 4.1 95.4± 0.2 84.8± 0.3 55.8± 4.0 93.3± 1.4
glove 90.3± 1.9 65.9± 6.2 94.9± 2.6 84.5± 1.0 54.8± 1.6 93.3± 1.5
Detecting Hateful Users
As we consider users and their connections in the network,
we can use information that is not available for models
which operate on the granularity level of tweets or com-
ments to detect hate speech.
• Activity/Network: Features such as number of statuses,
followers, followees, favorites, and centrality measure-
ments such as betweenness, eigenvector centrality and the
in/out degree of each node. We refer to these as user.
• GloVe: We also use spaCy’s off-the-shelf 300-
dimensional GloVe’s vector (Pennington, Socher,
and Manning 2014) as features. We average the represen-
tation across all words in a given tweet, and subsequently,
across all tweets a user has. We refer to these as glove.
Using these features, we compare experimentally two tra-
ditional machine learning models known to perform very
well when the number of instances is not very large: Gra-
dient Boosted Trees (GradBoost) and Adaptive Boosting
(AdaBoost); and a model aimed specifically at learning in
graphs, GraphSage (Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec 2017a)
(GraphSage). Interestingly, the latter approach is semi-
supervised, and allows us to use the neighborhood of the
users we are classifying even though they are not labeled,
exploiting the modularity between hateful and suspended
users we observed. The algorithm creates low-dimensional
embeddings for nodes, given associated features (unlike
other node embeddings, such as node2vec (Grover and
Leskovec 2016)). Moreover, it is inductive - which means
we don’t need the entire graph to run it. For additional in-
formation on node embeddings methods, refer to (Hamilton,
Ying, and Leskovec 2017b).
The GraphSage algorithm creates embeddings for each
node given that the nodes have associated features (in our
case the GloVe embeddings and activity/network-centrality
attributes associated with each user). Instead of generating
embeddings for all nodes, it learns a function that generate
embeddings by sampling and aggregating features from a
node’s local neighborhood. This strategy exploits the struc-
ture of the graph beyond merely using the features of the
neighborhood of a given node.
Experimental Settings
We run the algorithms trying to detect both hateful and nor-
mal users, as annotated by the crowdsourcing service, as
well as trying to detect which users got banned. We per-
form a 5-fold cross validation and report the F1-score, the
accuracy and the area under the ROC curve (AUC) for all
instances.
In all approaches we accounted for the class imbalance
(of approximately 1 to 10) in the loss function. We keep the
same ratio of positive/negative classes in both tasks, which,
in practice, means we used the 4981 annotated users in the
first setting (where approximately 11% were hateful) and, in
the second setting, selected 6680 users from the graph, in-
cluding the 668 suspended users, and other 5405 users ran-
domly sampled from the graph.
Notice that, as we are dealing with a binary classifica-
tion problem, we may control the trade-off between speci-
ficity and sensitivity by varying the positive-class threshold.
In this work we simply pick the largest value, and report
the resulting AUC score - which can be interpreted as the
probability of a classifier correctly ranking a random posi-
tive case higher than a random negative case.
Results
The results of our experiments are shown in Table 4. We
find that the node embedding approach using the features re-
lated to both users and the GloVe embeddings yields the best
results for all metrics in the two considered scenarios. The
Adaptative Boosting approach yields good AUC scores, but
incorrectly classifies many normal users as hateful, which
results in a low accuracy and F1-score.
Using the features related to users makes little difference
in many settings, yielding, for example, exactly the same
AUC, and very similar accuracy/F1-score in the Gradient
Boosting models trained with the two sets of parameters.
However, the usage of the retweet network yields promising
results, especially because we observe improvements in both
the detection of hateful users and of suspended users, which
shows the performance improvement occurs independently
of our annotation process.
Related Work
We review previous efforts to charactere and detect hate
speech in OSNs. Tangent problems such as cyber-bullying
and offensive language are not extensively covered; refer to
Schmidt and Wiegand.
Characterizing Hate
Hate speech has been characterized in websites and differ-
ent Online Social Networks. Gerstenfeld, Grant, and Chi-
ang analyze hateful websites characterizing their modus
operandi w.r.t. monetization, recruitment, and international
appeal. Chau and Xu identified and analyzed how hate-
groups organize around blogs. Silva et al. matches regex-
like expressions on large datasets on Twitter and Whisper to
characterize the targets of hate in Online Social Networks.
Chatzakou et al. characterized users and their tweets in the
specific context surrounding the #GamerGate controversy.
More generally, abuse online also has been characterized
on Community-Based Question Answering (Kayes et al.
2015), and in Ask.fm (Van Hee et al. 2015).
Detecting Hate
We briefly go through different steps carried by previous
work on the task detecting hate speech, analyzing the simi-
larities and differences to this work.
Data Collection Many previous studies collect data by
sampling OSNs with the aid of a lexicon with terms as-
sociated with hate speech (Davidson et al. 2017; Waseem
and Hovy 2016; Burnap and Williams 2016; Magu, Joshi,
and Luo 2017). This may be succeeded by expanding the
lexicon with co-occurring terms (Waseem and Hovy 2016).
Other techniques employed include matching regular ex-
pressions (Warner and Hirschberg 2012) and selecting fea-
tures in tweets from users known to have reproduced hate
speech (Kwok and Wang 2013). We employ a random-walk-
based methodology to obtain a generic sample of Twitter’s
retweet graph, use a lexicon of hateful words to obtain a sub-
sample of potentially hateful users and then select users to
annotate in different “distances” from these users, which we
obtain through a diffusion process. This allows us not to rely
directly on lexicon to obtain the sample to be annotated.
Annotation Human annotators are used in most previous
work on hate speech detection. This labeling may be done
by researchers themselves (Waseem and Hovy 2016; Kwok
and Wang 2013; Djuric et al. 2015; Magu, Joshi, and Luo
2017), selected annotators (Warner and Hirschberg 2012;
Gitari et al. 2015), or crowd-sourcing services (Burnap
and Williams 2016). Hate speech speech has been pointed
out as a difficult subject to annotate on (Waseem 2016;
Ross et al. 2017). Chatzakou et al. annotate tweets in ses-
sions, clustering several tweets to help annotators get a grasp
on context. We also employ CrowdFlower to annotate our
data. Unlike previous work, we give annotators the entire
profile of an user, instead of individual tweets. We argue
this provides better context for the annotators (Waseem et
al. 2017). The extent additional context improves annotation
quality is a promising research direction.
Features Features used in previous work are almost exclu-
sively content-related. The content from tweets, posts and
websites has been represented as n-grams, BoWs (Waseem
and Hovy 2016; Kwok and Wang 2013; Magu, Joshi, and
Luo 2017; Greevy and Smeaton 2004; Gitari et al. 2015),
and word embeddings such as paragraph2vec (Djuric et
al. 2015), GloVe (Pennington, Socher, and Manning 2014)
and FastText (Badjatiya et al. 2017). Other techniques
used to extract features from content include POS tagging,
sentiment analysis and ease of reading measures (Warner
and Hirschberg 2012; Davidson et al. 2017; Burnap and
Williams 2016; Gitari et al. 2015). Waseem and Hovy em-
ploy features not related to the content itself, using the gen-
der and the location of the creator of the content. We use
attributes related to the user’s activity, his network central-
ity and the content he or she produced in our characteriza-
tion and detection. In the context of detecting aggression and
cyber-bullying on Twitter, Chatzakou et al. employ a similar
set of features as we do.
Models Models used to classify these features in the ex-
isting literature include supervised classification methods
such as Naı¨ve-Bayes (Kwok and Wang 2013), Logistic Re-
gression (Waseem and Hovy 2016; Davidson et al. 2017;
Djuric et al. 2015), Support Vector Machines (Warner and
Hirschberg 2012; Burnap and Williams 2016; Magu, Joshi,
and Luo 2017), Rule-Based Classifiers (Gitari et al. 2015),
Random Forests (Burnap and Williams 2016), Gradient-
Boosted Decision Trees (Badjatiya et al. 2017) and Deep
Neural Networks (Badjatiya et al. 2017). We use Gradient-
Boosted Decision Trees, Adaptative Boosting and a semi-
supervised node embedding approach (GraphSage). Our ex-
periments shows that the latter performs significantly bet-
ter. A possible explanation for this is because hateful users
retweet other hateful users very often, which makes exploit-
ing the network structure beneficial.
Conclusion and Discussion
We present an approach to characterize and detect hate
speech on Twitter at a user-level granularity. Our method-
ology differs previous efforts, which focused on isolated
pieces of content, such as tweets and comments. (Greevy
and Smeaton 2004; Warner and Hirschberg 2012; Burnap
and Williams 2016). We developed a methodology to sam-
ple Twitter which consists of obtaining a generic subgraph,
finding users who employed words in a lexicon of hate-
related words and running a diffusion process based on De-
Groot’s learning model to sample for users in the neighbor-
hood of these users. We then used Crowdflower, a crowd-
sourcing service to manually annotate 4, 988 users, of which
544 (11%) were considered to be hateful. We argue that
this methodology aids two existing shortcomings of exist-
ing work: it allows the researcher to balance between having
a generic sample and a sample biased towards a set of words
in a lexicon, and it provides annotators with realistic context,
which is sometimes necessary to identify hateful speech.
Our findings shed light on how hateful users differ from
normal ones with respect to their user activity patterns, net-
work centrality measurements, and the content they pro-
duce. We discover that hateful users have created their ac-
counts more recently and write more negative sentences.
They use lexicon associated with categories such as hate,
terrorism, violence and anger less than normal ones, and cat-
egories of words such as love, work and masculinity more
frequently. We also find that the median hateful user is more
central and that hateful users are densely connected in the
retweet network. The latter finding motivates the use of an
inductive graph embedding approach to detect hateful users,
which outperforms widely used algorithms such as Gradient
Boosted Trees. As moderation of Online Social Networks
in many cases analyzes users, characterizing and detecting
hate on a user-level granularity is an essential step for creat-
ing workflows where humans and machines can interact to
ensure OSNs obey legislation, and to provide a better expe-
rience for the average user.
Nevertheless, our approach still has limitations that may
lead to interesting future research directions. Firstly, our
characterization only considered the behavior of users on
Twitter, and the same scenario in other Online Social Net-
works such as Instagram of Facebook may present differ-
ent challenges. Secondly, although classifying hateful users
provides contextual clues that are not available when look-
ing only at a piece of content, it is still a non-trivial task, as
hateful speech is subjective, and people can disagree with
what is hateful or not. In that sense, an interesting direc-
tion would be to try to create mechanisms of consensus,
where online communities could help moderate their con-
tent in a more decentralized fashion (like Wikipedia (Shi et
al. 2017)). Lastly, a research question in the context of de-
tecting hate speech on a user-level granularity that this work
fails to address is how much hateful content comes from how
many users. This is particularly important as, if we have a
Pareto-like distribution where most of the hate is generated
by very few users, then analyzing hateful users rather than
content becomes even more attractive.
An interesting debate which may arise when shifting the
focus on hate speech detection from content to users is how
this can potentially blur the line between individuals and
their speech. Twitter, for instance, implied it will consider
conduct occurring “off the platform” in making suspension
decisions (Kadri, Thomas 2018). In this scenario, approach-
ing the hate speech detection problem as we propose could
allow users to be suspended to ”contextual” factors - and not
for a specific piece of content he or she wrote. However, as
mentioned previously, such models can be used as a first step
to detect these users, which then will be assessed by humans
or other more specific methods.
The broader question this brings is to what extent a
“black-box” model may be used to aid in tasks such as con-
tent moderation, where this model may contain accidental or
intentional bias. These models can be used to moderate On-
line Social Networks, without the supervision of a human,
in which case its bias could be very damaging towards cer-
tain groups, even leading to possible suppressions of individ-
ual’s human rights, notably the right to free speech. Another
option would be to make a clear distinction between using
the model to detect possibly hateful or inadequate content
and delegating the task of moderation exclusively to a hu-
man. Although there are many shades of gray between these
two approaches, an important research direction is how to
make the automated parts of the moderation process fair, ac-
countable and transparent, which is hard to achieve even for
content-based approaches.
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